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Multiculturalism and Racialization in Latin America and the Caribbean 
 
Multiculturalismo y racialización en América Latina y el Caribe 
 
Bernd Reiter1 
 
Abstract 
This article, which is based on a keynote address, delivered for the 2nd International 
Congress of Caribbean Studies, held at the Universidad del Norte, Barranquilla, Colombia, 
in August of 2012, argues that Caribbean nations are in dire need to analyze and 
deconstruct the foundational myths upon which their national unities were constructed after 
achieving independence. This process is under way in such countries as Brazil, Mexico, and 
Colombia, but has not been carried out for most Caribbean nations, maybe with the 
exception of Cuba. Where such efforts have not been pursued vigorously, myths of racial 
harmony tend to prevail. These myths, while having served the initial purpose of 
undermining factionalism and potential secession, are now standing in the way of 
recognizing cultural diversity so that it can be addressed with meaningful public policies. 
Before a thorough dismantling of such foundational myths of racial harmony is achieved, 
multiculturalism, i.e. the equal recognition of different cultures living in one country, 
remains elusive. 
 
Key terms: Racism, multiculturalism, Caribbean, racial harmony, nationalism. 
 
Resumen 
Este artículo, basado en un discurso entregado con motivo del Segundo Congreso 
Internacional de Estudios del Caribe, celebrado en la Universidad del Norte, Barranquilla, 
Colombia, en agosto de 2012, argumenta que las naciones del Caribe están en extrema 
necesidad de analizar y deconstruir los mitos fundacionales sobre los que se construyeron 
sus discursos de unidad nacional después de lograr la independencia. Este proceso está en 
marcha en países como Brasil, México y Colombia, pero no se ha llevado a cabo en la 
mayoría de las naciones del Caribe, tal vez con la excepción de Cuba. Los mitos de la 
armonía racial tienden a prevalecer donde dichos procesos no han tenido lugar. Estos mitos, 
si bien han servido el propósito inicial de socavar el faccionalismo y la secesión potencial, 
ahora son un obstáculo para el reconocimiento de la diversidad cultural,  impidiendo así 
que sea abordada con políticas públicas significativas. Hasta que el desmantelamiento de 
tales mitos fundacionales de la armonía racial no se logre, el multiculturalismo, es decir, el 
reconocimiento de la igualdad de las diferentes culturas bajo un mismo territorio nacional, 
sigue siendo un objetivo inalcanzable. 
 
Palabras clave: Racismo, multiculturalismo, el Caribe, la armonía racial, nacionalismo. 
 
                                                 
1 Ph.D. Department of Political Science, Graduate Center, City University of New York. Major Field: 
Comparative Politics. Researcher and professor at the University of South Florida. breiter@usf.edu  
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Introduction 
In this talk, I will share some thoughts and questions I have formulated for myself over the 
past years in my role as a researcher and scholar. During those years, I was fortunate 
enough to have lived in Colombia for two years (1988 – 1990), half of which I spent in 
Condoto, department of el Chocó. In 1992, I enrolled as a student at the Federal University 
if Bahia, Brazil – and I ended up living in that place for eight years. In all this time, I rather 
worked or studied issue of democracy, democratic participation, and what is often called 
“problems of development.” Very early on I realized that racism is one of the main factors 
that blocks development and democracy in those countries.  
After moving to the US, I thus focused my academic work on the question ‘how to achieve 
democracy and development’ which to me automatically meant: how to overcome 
inequality, exclusion, and stigmatization of blacks, indigenous people, and women. Instead 
of representing just an academic curiosity, this question was and continues to be connected 
to my effort to bridge the gap that often divides academic work from social activism.  
To overcome this division I am actively engaged in several projects that seek to bring 
activists together with academics. One of the most important ones is the network of Latin 
American and Caribbean black community organizations which is trying to launch a USF 
summer training institute for Afrodescendant community leaders, to be held every July in 
Panama. I have launched this initiate in April of 2010 and we published the papers 
presented at the initial conference as a book, entitled Afrodescendants, Identity, and the 
Struggle for Development in the Americas.2  
So it is with this background and experience of a practitioner and professor who teaches 
seminars on development, citizenship, and the making of race and nation at USF that I 
come to you today. I truly hope that some of my thoughts on this issue of multiculturalism 
and racialization in the Caribbean resonate with your own experiences and that they prove 
                                                 
2 Reiter, Bernd a Kimberly Eison Simmons (eds). Afrodescdendants, Identity, and the Struggle for 
Development in the Americas. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press. 2012. 
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stimulating. I composed this talk as a sort of thought provocation – so please forgive me if 
some o the ideas seem radical or offensive. My aim is not to insult, but to stimulate. 
I will divide this talk into two sections. First, I will talk about what from my standpoint 
appears to be the state of the art, or the things we know about multiculturalism and 
racialization in the region. Secondly, I will seek to deconstruct the notion of 
multiculturalism and argue that what we really are confronted with in the region is not 
multiculturalism, but European monoculturalism. Maybe as a German I can say: I know it 
when I see it. 
The State of the Art: What do we know about Multiculturalism and Racialization in 
Latin America and the Caribbean? 
Much has been written about Gilberto Freyre’s Democracia Racial as well as about José 
Vasconcelo’s Cosmic Race. Freyre and Vasconcelos provided their state elites with exactly 
those tropes that allowed them to forge nations where difference and claim-making based 
on previous discrimination, was made impossible thus not only saving those emerging 
states from potentially devastating law suits, but also offering to the different peoples living 
on Mexican and Brazilian soil a way to imagine themselves as a new and united people. 
Freyre in particular was enthusiastic about all of the great things that the new world offered 
– and all of the old things that migrants to this region could leave behind – not least of 
which racism. Of course, this stressing of the new ran against all those that were not new to 
this region: indigenous people.  
With the creation of powerful state apparatuses under Getúlio Vargas in Brazil and Porfirio 
Diaz in Mexico, both of whom made “order and progress” their guiding principle but 
emphasized order over progress, the idea of “one nation, indivisible” was actively 
promoted. To these new states, doing so was necessary due to the large numbers of 
immigrants, the legacy of slavery, and in general, the presence of very heterogeneous 
societies all over the region. By not only actively promoting the idea that “we are all the 
same,” but criminalizing anybody who dared to say otherwise, these emerging states were 
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able to achieve stability and undermine any attempts to forge potentially costly cleavages 
among its populations. Both Brazil and Mexico to this day deal with the legacies of those 
days, because in the name of nationalism, difference was abolished, but equality did not 
follow.  
At first, minorities seemed to have bought into these slogans of equality, as they promised 
to overcome a legacy of scientific racism and eugenics that clearly sought to promote 
whitening as the only means to achieve civilization and progress. With such racist thoughts, 
practices, and institutions as a backdrop, racial democracy and the idea of a cosmic race 
seemed very promising to all those that had previously been declared unfit, uncivilized, 
barbaric and degenerate mongrels by European and US scientists and their local elite 
adepts.   
As the Brazilian case shows, the tropes of the cosmic race and the racial paradise where all 
people are the same became a central part of collective imaginings of these emerging 
nations. This was achieved through a massive promotion through all the means that these 
modern states had at their disposal: radio, newspaper, ministries of propaganda, and most 
importantly: school books. Beginning in 1930s, Latin American school children were all 
taught that theirs was a nation where everybody is the same, that is: brown and mixed and 
where the only minorities were some tribal indigenous societies living in remote jungle 
areas.  
Like I said before: this story at first seemed appealing to almost all of the people living in 
any of the countries of the region. But as time went on, it became clear that this was after 
all only a story, propagated by powerful state elites who seemed to spare no effort in 
proclaiming equality while constantly enacting inequality. For those same elites did not 
seem comfortable when identified as mixed and half-black or half-indigenous themselves. 
Some of these elites went so far as to adopt indigenous names (as in Mexico), but they 
hardly ever seemed to associate with indigenous people, nor did they speak their languages. 
Latin American elites, instead, continued to associate and identify themselves with the 
white European colonizers that invaded these lands in the 16th century. However, as time 
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went by and the poor, the excluded, and ethnic minorities started to organize for change by 
challenging these stories, sometimes threatening to overcome their internal divisions and 
joining together under one, big social movement, most Latin American elites saw the 
dangers in such an alliance and called on the military to avoid any such radical social 
changes that could topple them from power. 
It took many years of clandestine organizing and careful mobilizing, sometimes under the 
disguise of the Catholic Church, to finally break the power of traditional elites and their 
military governments. Only in the 1980s, which is commonly called “the lost decade” in 
Latin America, were the excluded able to topple authoritarian regimes and find ways to 
finally make their voices heard. The 1980s was thus not a lost decade for everybody. For 
the historically excluded, it was a decade of re-democratization and increased organization 
and successful mobilization, so that finally, in the 1990s, we were able to witness changes 
in the social hierarchies and associated power structures of some Latin American countries. 
Under their new presidents, most Latin American countries changed their constitutions and 
for the first time officially recognized that they even had minorities. Some of them started 
to enact special policies targeted at those populations. Examples include the 1991 
Colombian Constitution, Affirmative Action in Brazil, anti-discrimination legislation in 
Mexico, the 1997 Peruvian law which criminalizes discrimination, the new constitutions of 
Ecuador and Bolivia, as well as several policies and projects for Garifunas in Honduras, for 
indigenous people in Chile, and for Afro-descendants in Colombia. 
It is only now that the age-old “social question” is taking center stage among Latin 
American political leaders and it is not so much because they want to do that, but rather 
because they receive massive pressure from below. Latin American social movements are 
as powerful as ever and they clearly demonstrate that no change will come from above – 
just as American civil rights did not come from above.  
At this point, then, the story of how elites constructed tropes of racial harmony and how 
Afro-Brazilians were able to fight back the hegemonic ideology of a racial democracy that 
de-legitimized their efforts to organize is well told. The Colombian story is also emerging 
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strongly, with the help of such outstanding scholars as Alfonso Munera3 and Arturo 
Escobar4, among many others. Other, similar, stories are struggling to reach the surface of 
national and international attention, thanks to the pioneering work of such scholars as Peter 
Wade5 and Aleandro de la Fuente,6 whose work focuses on race and nationalism in Cuba. 
The situation of Bolivian indigenous and black people is slowly taking shape, as is the story 
of those groups in Peru and Ecuador. We now also know more about the situation of 
indigenous and black groups living in Panama, Costa Rica, Honduras, and Nicaragua, 
thanks to the outstanding work of people like Juliet Hooker7. 
The same is not true for the Caribbean. There are very view analyses of how national 
identity favored white and brown people over black people, however defined. Every time I 
have a student wanting to write about racial identity and nationalism in the Dominican 
Republic, they face a shortage of relevant literature. But the Dominican Republic is not the 
worst. How about racial and social hierarchies in Haiti, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Jamaica, 
the smaller leeward and windward islands, and the leeward Antilles? We know next to 
nothing about the forging of nationalism in the Caribbean – maybe because it is a difficult 
topic for this region, as independence arrived late, or never to Jamaica, Puerto Rico, Aruba, 
Curação, Guadeloupe, and Martinique and the question of national identity emerges 
together with the question of independence.  
For whatever reason, research on nationalism, multiculturalism, and cultural rights in the 
Caribbean is scarce and where it exists, it does not reach a broader audience, maybe 
because other problems seem more important. I want to argue here today that research on 
how nations are defined and by whom this defining is done is of the utmost importance and 
consequence. The same is true for research on the social movements that resist such 
violently inclusive constructions of nationalism. 
                                                 
3 Munera, Alfonso. El fracaso de la nación. Región, clase y raza en el Caribe colombiano (1717- 1821). 
Cartagena: Ancora Editores. 1998 
4 Escobar, Arturo. Territories of Difference. Durham: Duke University Press. 2008. 
5 Wade, Peter. Race and Ethnicity in Latin America. London: Pluto Press. 2010 
6 Fuente, Alejandro de la. A Nation for All. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2000. 
7 Hooker, Juliet. Race and the Politics of Solidarity. New York: Oxford University Press. 2009. 
MEMORIAS  
Revista digital de Historia y Arqueología desde el Caribe colombiano 
 
Año 10, N°19. Barranquilla, enero – abril 2013. ISSN 1794‐8886  36  
We know this, for example, about Jamaica, the birthplace of Black Nationalism. In 
Jamaica, paralleling the story of most of Latin America, “out of many, one people” has 
remained an empty promise and a promise that only superficially disguises the deep-seated 
colorism that informs the social hierarchies of that country. In doing that, colorism is a 
racial project, even if it differs from those enacted and reproduced elsewhere. The story 
how Jamaican brown nationalism was constructed, by whom, and with what means, 
however, remains to be told and explained. Only very recently have social scientists begun 
to tackle these issues. My friend and colleague Maziki Thame8, a political scientist of the 
University of Jamaica, Mona Campus, wrote that in Jamaica, brown-skin people like 
Manley and Bustamante successfully mobilized the black masses – only to secure office for 
themselves and excluding blacks. By doing so, they confirmed the racial project of Jamaica, 
which is one based on colorism. Haiti has a similar history, not yet coherently told (despite 
the excellent work of such authors as Laurent Dubois9 and C. L. R. James, author of The 
Black Jacobins10. In post-revolutionary Haiti, light-skin mulattoes took over the privileges 
of white elites and they have tried to hold and defend these privileges to this day. Thus even 
in Haiti colorism informs merit, beauty, and political power. Or think about the Dominican 
Republic. There, colorism is so pervasive that blackness is vehemently denied by the big 
majority of the country.  
To capture these constructions and ideological justifications of political power, merit, 
beauty, and social hierarchy, one needs to see beyond skin color and whiteness vs. 
blackness. Biology is not the relevant factor here. It is how biology is interpreted, 
categorized, and hierarchized. Being white, black, brown, mulatto, mestizo, etc. means 
different things in different countries and not all labels carry the same value everywhere. 
Anybody trying to explain Latin American or Caribbean social and racial hierarchies to 
North Americans knows this from experience. This is so because racial projects are national 
projects. They emerge when political elites decide where to draw the dividing line among 
the people living under one state. That is why we talk about racial regimes; because state 
                                                 
8 Thame, Maziki. “Reading Violence and Postcolonial Decolonization through Fanon: The Case of Jamaica.” 
The Journal of Pan African Studies, vol.7, n.7 (November 2011): 75-93 
9 Dubois, Laurent. A Colony of Citizens. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2006. 
10 James, C.L.R. The Black Jacobins. New York: Vintage. 1989. 
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power is involved in these projects. The political elites of any country, at a certain point in 
time, normally right around independence, have to decide how to best achieve their main 
goals, which are: first, to secure enough followers so they can stay in power, i.e. to defend 
their political supremacy; and second, to use this political power to secure their economic 
supremacy, i.e. to defend their inherited economic privileges. These two motives are 
universal – at least we can assume them to be for analytical purposes, so we can then see 
how much insights these assumption render. Normally, they explain a lot.  
The central question that political elites face after independence is with whom to ally and 
against whom. Anthony Marx11 has illustrated the analytical power of this framework. The 
answer to this question for political elites is simple: ally with the strong, against the weak. 
If the strong are sufficient in number, or sufficiently armed, we end up getting typical 
white-dominated planter societies, based on racial regimes where the white inheritors of 
colonial rule control all of the social, economical, political, and even cultural life of a 
country. They rule and decide what is worthy and beautiful. This is the story of the USA.  
If the political elites are not powerful enough or too small in number and if they do not 
have enough obvious allies, the story gets more complicated. Under such circumstances, 
allies have to be made. This is normally achieved through the dissemination of ideologies 
that rely either explicitly or implicitly on the idea of national unity and mestizaje. However, 
none o these ideologies are strong enough to break the power of the usage of whiteness as a 
sort of symbolic capital, inherited from colonial time and used as a tool to secure and 
defend privilege. By ordering life around the doctrine “the whiter the better” political elites 
are able to weaken potential power contenders, breaking them apart. Look at Brazil for a 
prime example. To this day, the black majority is unable to overcome its internal divisions 
and elect black candidates to political office. Or look at Colombia, where majorities have 
been treated as minorities ever since independence and their role in the country’s history 
systematically denied.  In all of this, whiteness is not a biological certainty, but a symbolic 
capital carefully constructed and negotiated in daily interactions. 
                                                 
11 Marx, Anthony. Making Race and Nation. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1998. 
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What is the story of nation building and race-making in the Caribbean? Maybe with the 
exception of Cuba, we do not know. What we do know is that nation-making and race-
making go hand in hand. Race should thus not be treated as a cause, or independent 
variable, but as an effect or outcome, a dependent variable. When national elites forge 
nations that serve them and their interests, some groups are placed outside of the realm of 
citizenship. Because they are excluded and mistreated, they become a race. Race, thus, is a 
shared experience of exclusion and mistreatment, not a biological reality. If Colombian 
elites tomorrow decide to systematically discriminate against all those people with big 
noses, then the people with big noses will eventually become a race and self-identify as 
such. Look at the history of the Jews in Europe or the Japanese Burakumin for examples on 
how “races” are made through discrimination. However, discrimination creates solidarity 
and brings people together that otherwise would have nothing in common, thus forging 
“racial solidarity” which has been and can still easily be used as a way for political 
mobilization. Think of the case of the Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda as a prime example.  
The choices that emerging national elites have are relatively few. In some countries, elites 
ally with the strongest groups against those unable to pose enough of a threat to national 
unity, thus creating apartheid and segregation regimes. This is the case for the US and such 
countries as South Africa. In others, elites are able to diffuse potential opposition of the 
masses by disseminating ideologies of amalgamation and mestizo nations. This is the case 
for most of Latin America and the Caribbean. Accordingly, the racial regimes look and 
operate very differently in different countries – but they all achieve the same outcome: to 
secure traditional elite privilege in the political and economic spheres by invoking skin 
color as a marker of merit, beauty, and higher level of civilization.  
So what does this mean for the Caribbean? And what can be said about multiculturalism 
and racialization in the Caribbean? I will elaborate on this question in the second part of my 
talk: The first question we need to ask when discussing multiculturalism is what the word 
means. This leads me to the second, and final, part of my talk. 
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What is “multiculturalism?” 
From my reading of such authors as Charles Taylor12 and Will Kymlicka13, 
multiculturalism stands for different groups living together under one one nation, where the 
cultural particularities of each one receives equal respect and treatment from the 
government and the different citizens. It is based on the recognition of groups perceived as 
being different. The classic example for this is Canada, where Anglophones and 
Francophones were able to defend their different cultures and languages – as well as the 
native Inuit, who achieved state autonomy from the central government in 1999 by creating 
the autonomous territory of Nunavut. It comes to no surprise that both authors mentioned 
above are Canadians.  
What are the prerequesits for something like this to happen?  
First, there must be different groups living under one nation state. Secondly, these groups 
must interact with each other as groups and recognize each other’s claims for recognition 
and difference. To the best of my knowledge, none of these two preconditions hold in the 
Caribbean. At the level of groups, it appears that there are no groups in countries like 
Jamaica, Haiti, or the Dominican Republic. Precisley due to a very pervasive framing of 
“one nation, undivided” the legitimacy for groupness has been severly undermined almost 
everywhere in Latin America and the Caribbean. Black social movements have thus had a 
very diffult time almost everywhere when trying to forge some sort of group solidarity 
among their nonwhite populations. The only exceptions come from places where there was 
a rather late migration of West Indians into the nation, as in Panama, Honduras, Costa Rica, 
and the Nicaraguan Caribbean cost. In all those cases, those immigrants were able to hold 
on to their distinct language (mostly English) and their Caribbean culture. In most cases, 
these groups also did not merge into a larger black group with the local “colonials.” 
Instead, they carved out positions of relative privilege for themselves, which required a 
                                                 
12 Taylor, Charles. Multiculturalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1994. 
13 Kymlicka, Will. Multicultural Citizenship. New York: Oxford University Press. 1996. 
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distancing from the local black population. So with the exception of these late black 
migrant populations, there are no groups in a strict sense in the Caribbean.  
For groups to take on an ontological reality, people have to first believe and act 
accordingly. Sometimes, this is achieved through statistics, because statistics and 
particulalry censuses create different categories to divide the population. Those categories 
can be of the utmost importance, as such authos as Melissa Noble14 have shown for Brazil. 
Her work, just like most of the work on this topic, relies on the groundbreaking research of 
Benedict Anderson15 and Eric Hobsbawm16. What all these authors demonstrate is that 
census data is very sensitve and can be very explosive, because it provides those that seek 
to construct groupness with the necessary arguments and evidence. This is the insight of 
Rogers Brubaker17, when he discusses the role of “ethnopolitical entrepreneurs” in forging 
groupness.  
As census are conducted by states and states can be assumed, in most cases, to be 
controlled by traditional elites, it becomes clear why most states are so reluctant to provide 
census information. Because census information is like ammunition. Just imagine what 
could happened if we had reliable information about black unemployment compared to 
white unemployment, black and white educational levels, incarceration rates, etc. in 
Caribbean and Latin American countries. 
Well – I think everybody can imagine what happens: It is enough to look at the US to get a 
sense. From the US case, we can learn that categories reflect back on people’s lives and 
they start using these categories to self-identify. This is the biggest fear of many elites in 
most the Caribbean basin – even those where “whiteness” is not a biogical reality at all and 
                                                 
14 Noble, Melissa. Shades of Citizenship. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 2000. 
15 Anderson, Benedict.  Imagined Communities. New York: Verso. 2006. 
16 Hobsbawm, Eric. Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Cambridge: Cambridge University  
Press. 2012. 
17 Brubaker, Rogers.  Ethnicity without Groups. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2006. 
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almost nobody can claim it. This fear is probably best summed up by the book title of 
Brazilian author Celia de Azevedo: Onda Negra Medo Branco18. 
To come back to my topic, I suggests that the first learning in this reflection is that groups 
are social phenomena that need to be mutually recognized for them to have any effect on 
real life. Even more: they need to be officially recognized by states for them to have any 
real consequence in such fields as politics and policy, that is: areas that affect power and 
privilege. Without such recognition, there can be no multiculturalism.  
For this to happen, groups must first be proposed, or invented, and then the idea of a 
specific groupness must be actively disseminated by ethnopolitical entrepreneurs and their 
organizations. In this process, the state and the media are of crucial importance and no 
groupness will emerge without an active dissemination of this way of defining one nation. 
So for now, my diagnosis is that, with the exception of indigenous groups, there are no 
groups in Latin America and the Caribbean and hence there is no multiculturalism.  
What do we have instead? 
I would argue that we have nations that are biologically brown, black, and mixed but that 
remain firmly European in their culture and value system. To this day, my sense is that the 
Caribbean is a sort of Tropical Europe, where those that were able to secure colonial 
privileges for themselves have actively defended them by claiming some sort of whiteness, 
or Europeanness, or civilizational advantage for themselves.  
This is even more astounding if we consider that in some islands, there are virtually no 
biological whites. So what we are facing today all over the Caribbean Basin is a European 
monoculturalism that is sometimes sustained despite the absence of Europeans and their 
white descendants. This is possible, because the label “white” really stands for privilege, 
where reference to whiteness is just one way out of many to justify such undeserved 
privilege. Of all the possible ways to achieve this, whiteness is particulalry effective, due to 
                                                 
18 Azevedo, Celia de. Onda Negra Medo Branco. São Paulo: Ana Blume. 1987. 
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its colonial reference. But others work just as well, so that we are confronted with local 
varieties of defenindig privilege that make use of  skin color, religion, descent, gender, etc. 
So to conclude: 
Biological diversity has nothing to do with cultural, or even national, recognition. What the 
example of the Caribbean shows us is precisely that it is possible to construct monocultural 
systems of value and social, economical, as well a political hierarchies that are constructed 
through their relation to whiteness and Europeanness – even in the absence of whites and 
Europeans in the country. This is mind-boggling – as anybody reading the work of Frantz 
Fanon quickly understands. 
The only serious contentions against this European monoculturalism comes from Black 
Nationalism and Rastafarianism, thus from Jamaica. Even the pretty strong negritude 
movement around such authors as Aime Cesaire was not able to effectively challenge this 
monoculturalism, probably because negritude has remained a literary movement and as 
such never truly threatened white economic and political supremacy, nor did it challenge 
the state.  
Rastafarianism and Black Nationalism, to the contrary, have done precisely that an in doing 
so they represent the only true, and known, multicultural and multinational projects in the 
region, even if there are others, such as the movement of Garifunas, Cimarrones, 
Palenqueros, and others. What sets Rastafarianism and Black Nationalism apart is that they 
are political projects that are constructed on notions of difference and recognition that 
automatically lead to process of racialization and the forging of racial solidarity that is able 
to bridge the internal divisions caused by the biological, ethnic, and linguistic diversity of 
all those that form part of it. Through framing and disseminating their destinies as one and 
the same, they actively engage in racialization for the sake of creating a race and with it, 
racial solidarity. In doing that, they go 100 percent against the dominant trope of unity, 
harmony, and oneness, which is why these movements are perceived as so radical and 
threatening by traditional elites.  
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